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Abstract 
This paper attempts to address one major problem with bubble studies: the difficulty to 
rigorously compare assets bubbles (that is to say compare them via quantitative data, rather 
than simply anecdotal evidence). The idea of the paper is to use a metric that is not the level of 
price itself, but that is connected to it. This metric is price momentum (i.e. the magnitude and 
speed of price changes). Momentum is measured with a technical indicator: the Relative 
Strength Index (RSI). The RSI is popular among traders, yet it is not normally used as a tool of 
comparison. In particular, there appears to be no academic study that has hitherto employed 
the RSI as a metric to compare different booms and crashes. Likewise, it seems that the RSI 
was never applied to early modern markets (such as the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles), or 
to early 20th century markets (such as the 1929 crash). The paper does all this (based on historical 
securities prices). Furthermore, it develops news concepts and metrics (such as “strong 
momentum with low volatility”, “momentum efficiency”, and accumulated RSI readings) that 
are connected to the notion of momentum. These concepts, in turn, are interpreted through 
the lens of archival evidence. The result is a new method of analysis – which is not concerned 
with market forecasting, but only with comparison and historical interpretation – that sheds 
new light on the 1719-20 bubbles themselves.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Financial history, South Sea Bubble, Mississippi Bubble, Dutch Wind Trade, bubbles and crashes in 
asset markets, Relative Strength Index, technical analysis, momentum, volatility, euphoria. (JEL F31, G01, G10, 
G14, G15, G19, N23). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abbreviations 
 
AuM accumulated upward momentum (sum of RSI readings ≥ 70) 
AdM  accumulated downward momentum (sum of RSI readings ≤ 30) 
uSMLV upward strong momentum with low volatility  
dSMLV downward strong momentum with low  
mP  maximum price increase during the boom (in percentage) 
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Introduction 
Although widely used among academics and practitioners, the notion of asset bubbles presents 
a number of problems. First, there is no consensus among economists about the very existence 
of asset market bubbles.1  Second, there is no commonly agreed definition of the term: in 
particular, if the classic meaning of bubble is a boom followed by a crash, some scholars consider 
that it is possible and useful to employ the word even when a boom does not end in a sudden 
and abrupt way. 2  Third, precise measures of bubbles have proved elusive. 3  Fourth, as a 
consequence of above, it is difficult to rigorously compare asset bubbles, that is to say compare 
them via quantitative data (rather than simply anecdotal evidence).4 In fact, few studies have 
taken that path.5 And no study, hitherto, has attempted a quantitative comparison of bubbles 
from different centuries and different asset classes. 
This paper addresses this fourth problem. It proposes a method that can be used to compare 
systematically all types of booms and crashes. The paper applies this method to 1719-20 equity 
and foreign exchange markets, including the famous Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles. A 
second paper will enlarge the analysis to the XXth and XXIst centuries and to other asset classes 
(commodities and housing market). 
The consideration underpinning this work is that comparative analysis is an indispensable 
tool of investigation in social science research. As long as we cannot compare all market booms 
and crashes (big and small, rational or irrational, from whatever century, country, and asset 
class) there is a strong probability that we may miss some crucial features of these phenomena.  
The question, however, is what to compare. Comparing price levels – the primary method 
followed in the field of bubble studies – presents major difficulties. Even setting aside the 
obstacle of fundamental value (i.e. measuring how much all these assets, in all these countries 
and centuries, deviated from their “fundamental” value), there is simply too much diversity in 
terms of price levels among the different bubbles.6 The idea of the paper is to use a metric that 
is not the level of price itself, but that is connected to it. This metric is price momentum. 
Momentum measures the magnitude and speed of price changes. Magnitude is self-explicatory; 
speed of price changes is nothing else than the steadiness in the directionality of prices, the 
consistency in the trend. A hypothetical market with only up (or down) days would have an 
                                               
1 Proponents of the efficient market theory question the existence of asset bubbles. See for instance Fama, E.F., 
“Two pillars of asset pricing”, The American Economic Review, 104, 6 (2014). 
2 Shiller, R. J., “Speculative asset prices”, The American Economic Review, 104, 6 (2014). 
3 For an overview of the question: White, E. N., “The Fundamental Things Apply: How to Face Up to Asset 
Market Bubbles”, in Chambers, D. & Dimson, E. (eds.), Financial Market History: Reflections on the Past for Investors 
Today (Charlottesville, 2016). 
4 For the latter approach, e.g. Kindleberger, C. P. & Aliber, R. Z., Manias, Panics and Crashes. A History of Financial 
Crises (Basingstoke, 2015) [1978]. 
5 E.g. White, E. N., “Bubbles and Busts: The 1990s in the Mirror of the 1920s”, NBER working papers (2006); 
Goetzmann, W. N., “Bubble Investing: Learning from History”, in Chambers, D. & Dimson, E. (eds.), cit. 
6 For example, the metric used by Goetzmann, “Bubble Investing”, cit., to identify booms and crashes in equity 
markets would not work equally well with foreign exchange or housing markets. 
 6 
extremely strong momentum, whatever the magnitude of the price changes. Magnitude and 
speed are two typical characteristics of price movements during a bubble: booms and busts are 
by definition markets with strong momentum. 
Technical analysts have developed several indicators to calculate price momentum: the 
Relative Strength Index (RSI), the Moving Average Convergence/Divergence, the Williams % 
Range, the Stochastic Oscillator, etc.7 Any of them could suit our analysis, and it would be 
interesting to understand if they would provide significantly different results. This study, 
however, will only use the RSI, probably the most popular among traders.8  
A few academic papers have analysed the effectiveness of the RSI as a trading tool;9 other 
papers employ it as a proxy for market sentiment.10 However, there appears to be no academic 
study that has hitherto employed the RSI as a metric to compare different booms and crashes. 
Likewise, it seems that the RSI was never applied to early modern markets (such as the 
Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles), or to early 20th century markets (such as the 1929 crash).  
The first contribution of this paper, therefore, is to bring together two fields that, although 
not entirely disconnected, are usually separated: technical analysis and financial history. To say 
it more accurately, technical analysts certainly look back to historical series of prices, but it is 
uncommon for financial historians, especially historians of early modern finance, to open the 
toolbox of technical analysis. And yet, it is a heuristic experiment to study markets from three 
centuries ago with today’s tools. Does the RSI work exactly in the same way when applied to 
eighteen-century equity and foreign exchange markets? Does it follow the same kind of 
patterns? That would be interesting if that were the case, because that would suggest that, in 
spite of all sorts of massive transformations (in the cultural attitudes towards speculation, 
communication systems, financial contracts enforcements, risk management, accumulated 
secular experience of investors, etc.), the fundamental mechanisms of securities markets have 
not significantly changed in the last three centuries. Anyhow, although it uses a technical 
analysis tool, the present study is not concerned with market forecasting; it is only concerned 
with analysis, comparison, and understanding.  
The second contribution is specifically about the 1719-20 bubbles. In a practical, visual way, 
price momentum analysis changes our perspective on the trajectory followed by the stocks that 
were part of these bubbles.  
                                               
7 See for instance Murphy, J. J., Technical Analysis of the Financial Markets (New York, 1999). 
8 To give an example, the RSI is one of the two only technical indicators that J.C. Parets, a reputed technical 
analyst, uses in all his charts. 
9 E.g. Biondo, A. E. et al., “Are random trading strategies more successful than technical ones?”, PloS one, 8, 7 
(2013); Anderson, B. & Li, S. ,“An investigation of the relative strength index”, Banks and Bank Systems, 10, 1 (2015); 
Hudson, R. et al., “Sampling frequency and the performance of different types of technical trading rules”, Finance 
Research Letters (2017). 
10 Chen, H et al., “A principal-component approach to measuring investor sentiment”, Quantitative Finance, 10, 4, 
(2010); Kim, T. & Ha, N., “Investor sentiment and market anomalies”, SSRN Working Paper, (2010); Yang, C., & 
Zhou, L., “Investor trading behavior, investor sentiment and asset prices”, The North American Journal of Economics 
and Finance, 34 (2015). 
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I. The momentum model and toolbox 
1. The standard RSI equation  
The RSI was created by J. W. Wilder in his 1978 book, New concepts in technical trading systems. 
Wilder wanted to improve the momentum indicators existing at the time, by providing a tool 
that would produce fewer erratic results. The RSI was thus designed as a range-bound 
exponential moving average. The time frame first suggested by Wilder – 14 days – has become 
standard and is used today by most practitioners. The initial equation is the following: 
 
RSI = 100-(100/1+RS) 
RS = average gain/average loss 
Average gain = (sum of gains over the past 14 days)/14 
Average loss = (sum of losses over the past 14 days)/14 
 
To prevent the RSI from overreacting to sharp price changes, from the 15th day on, the 
calculation becomes similar to an exponential moving average: 
 
Average gain = ((previous average gain X 13) + current gain)/14 
Average loss = ((previous average loss X 13) + current loss)/14 
 
For any security, gains or losses are simply computed by subtracting the closing price of day n 
to the closing price of day n-1. Losses are expressed as positive numbers, in order to let the RSI 
fluctuate between 0 and 100. Although the RSI is rarely used for that purpose, it is interesting 
to note that Wilder had explicitly devised it to be range-bound to facilitate comparisons between 
different types of securities.11 
The key levels in the RSI are 70 and 30. When the RSI goes beyond 70, the security is 
deemed “overbought”; when it falls below 30 it is deemed “oversold”. 12  In both cases, 
practitioners consider that a reversal in the price will take place soon or later. This is consistent 
                                               
11 Wilder, J. W., New concepts, cit., p. 67: “The RSI value must always fall between 0 and 100. Therefore, the daily 
momentum of any number of commodities [assets] can be measured on the same scale for comparison to each other 
and to previous highs and lows within the same commodity. The most active commodities are those in which the 
RSI is showing the greatest vertical movement – either up or down.” Italics are mine. 
12 See for instance Di Lorenzo, R., Basic Technical Analysis of Financial Markets (New York, 2013). Some practitioners 
(such as Murphy, Technical Analysis, cit.) reckon that 80 is the “overbought” threshold in a bull market; 20 the 
“oversold” threshold in a bear market. 
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with the evidence that momentum and mean-reversion occur in the same assets.13 For that 
reason, the RSI is a prominent indicator for mean-reversion trading strategies.14  
The 70 and 30 levels are based on empirical evidence: the RSI, most of the time, does not 
breach them, and it is rare that it stays beyond them for many days in a row. Between 7 October 
1896 and 12 January 2018, the average RSI for the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) was 
53, slightly more than the “neutral market momentum” level of 50: a reading consistent with 
the secular bullish trend of the index. There were 32,932 trading days during that time, 
including 3,438 days (10% of the time) when the RSI was above 70, and 1,358 days (4% of the 
time) when it was below 30. But there were only few occurrences (see table below) when the 
RSI was above 70, or below 30, for 15 days or more in a row. 
 
Table 1. RSI of the DJIA (7 Oct. 1896-12 Jan. 2018) 
 Number of occurrences Number of days % of total trading days 
RSI ≥ 70 for 15 days or more 42 852 2.59% 
RSI ≥ 70 for 25 days or more 6 170 0.52% 
RSI ≥ 70 for 30 days or more 2 64 0.19% 
RSI ≤ 30 for 15 days or more 5 93 0.28% 
RSI ≤ 30 for 20 days or more 2 43 0.13% 
 
 
Considering that the DJIA increased by 90,310% during those 122 years, with long-lasting 
booms and sharp crashes, it is safe to say that it was not that common for the RSI to hover 
above 70 or below 30 for extended periods. A simple look at the RSI graph from any asset 
(stocks, commodities, exchange rates) presents the same pattern: readings above 70 or below 30 
are relatively uncommon; most of the time, the indicator fluctuates between 40 and 60. This is 
the key point for comparative analysis: that recurring pattern means that it is meaningful to 
compare RSI graphs – especially the 70 and 30 levels – across all types of assets. And this is true 
also for 1719-1720 markets. 
 
 
2. Building upon the standard equation: the notion of strong momentum with low volatility  
Building upon the RSI equation, the paper proposes a model with three distinct momentum 
phases: a) weak momentum; b) strong momentum; c) strong momentum with low volatility. 
                                               
13 Balvers, R. J. & Wu, Y., “Momentum and mean reversion across national equity markets”, Journal of Empirical 
Finance, 13, 1 (2006). 
14 See for instance Zhang, X. et al., “An evolutionary trend reversion model for stock trading rule discovery”, 
Knowledge-Based Systems, 79, (2015); Lan, Y. W. et al., “The Stock Investment Strategy at Company 
Acquisition”, International Journal of Management Science and Business Administration, 2 (3) (2016); Hudson, R. et al, 
“Sampling frequency and the performance of different types of technical trading rules”, Finance Research Letters, 22 
(2017). 
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Strong momentum is simply defined as the RSI reaching overbought (≥70) or oversold (≤30) 
levels. Strong momentum with low volatility (low volatility in the RSI, as well as in the 
underlying price) is defined here as the situation where the RSI stays in overbought or oversold 
territory for 15 days or more. A 15 days threshold seems a good compromise: it corresponds to 
a relatively rare situation (only 42 occurrences for the DJIA in over 122 years), but not so rare 
as to become irrelevant. Examples drawn from the 1719-1720 can illustrate each of these 
phases.15 
 
a) A weak momentum phase (WM) does not represent necessarily a sideways trend; it may 
characterize an upward (or downward) trend with a slow rate of price change. The speed of 
price change represents the steadiness in the directionality of prices (see above). A slow rate of 
price change is, therefore, typically the result of sharp fluctuations in the price. The Dutch East 
India Company (VOC), between 22 May and 14 September 1720, is a good example. From 
trough (17 Jun.) to peak (19 Aug.), its price rose by 18%, yet it was so volatile that the RSI did 
not reach overbought level (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Weak momentum: VOC price and RSI (22 May-15 Sep. 1720)16 
 
b) A strong momentum phase (SM) typically characterizes a market trending with a fast rate of 
price change; a sustained (upwards or downwards) pressure in the price. The South Sea 
Company, from 8 March to 31 May 1720, is an example of such a phase. During that period, 
its share rose by 134%. As the price surged sharply, the RSI stayed 13 days (28 Mar.-9 Apr.) 
                                               
15 I am considering putting online a spreadsheet with examples of calculations, in order to illustrate some of the 
difficulties, choices, and (sometimes) extrapolations involved. 
16 Unless indicated otherwise, the source of all the price data is the FGR 1720 price database by R.G.P. Frehen, 
W.N. Goetzmann & K.G. Rouwenhorst, “New evidence on the first financial bubble”, NBER working paper (2011). 
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above 70, briefly reaching the extremely high level of 96. It then fell to 54, went back to 74, fell 
to 61, and finished the month of May at 84 (Figure 2). The volatility in the RSI mirrored the 
volatility in the price.  
 
 
Figure 2. Strong momentum: South Sea Comp. price and RSI (8 Mar.-31 May 1720) 
 
c) A strong momentum with low volatility phase (SMLV) is the hallmark of a very strong trend. 
The Mississippi Company, between 17 June and 22 September 1719, is a remarkable 
illustration of such a situation. During those 98 days, the stock surged by 785%, with the RSI 
constantly over 70 (Figure 3).17 The RSI spiked five times above 90 and hovered 59 days (21 
Jul.-17 Sep. 1719) over 80. After a pause of little more than one month, the Mississippi entered 
a new SMLV that lasted 48 days (23 Oct.-9 Dec. 1719). Although less impressive, the 
Amsterdam and London indexes (see below) represented two other outstanding cases of a 
SMLV: the first stayed 61 days (13 Jul.-11 Sep. 1720) above 70; the second 50 days (5 Mar.-21 
Jun. 1720). In comparison, the record upward SMLV for the DJIA was only 34 trading days 
(23 Mar.-1st May 1915).  
In general, SMLVs tend to be shorter on the downside compared to the upside. The 
Mississippi remained 36 straight days below 30 (11 Dec. 1720-15 Jan. 1721); the London index 
23 days (19 Sep.-11 Oct. 1720); the Amsterdam index 45 days (12 Oct.-23 Nov. 1720). The 
record for the DJIA was only 22 trading days below 30 (31 May-21 Jun. 1921). 
In the following pages we will use abbreviations to distinguish an upward SMLV (uSMLV) 
from a downward SMLV (dSMLV). 
 
 
                                               
17 According to the available data, I sometimes calculate in days, rather than trading days. I consider that the 
results are, nonetheless, entirely comparable. See note 15. 
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Figure 3. Strong momentum with low volatility: Mississippi Comp. price and RSI (Jun.-Sep. 1719) 
 
 
3. How did historical actors perceive SMLV phases? 
The Mississippi Bubble’s massive momentum was a great source of astonishment for the 
contemporaries. Archival evidence shows that this feeling of astonishment evolved as the SMLV 
appeared to last indefinitely. There were, obviously, idiosyncrasies among the many historical 
actors, yet it is possible to discern nonetheless an overall common pattern. A pattern made of 
three stages. The first stage was – depending on the experience of the person – surprise or 
incomprehension: simple surprise for the most naïve observers; a mixture of surprise and 
incomprehension for the others. For instance, early July 1719, the marquis de Dangeau noted 
that the “daily increase” (i.e. the fact that there were almost only up days) of the Mississippi 
share price “seemed incomprehensible to many people” (including himself).18 In October 1719, 
as the stock was about to enter its last SMLV phase, a well-informed diplomat of the British 
embassy in Paris wrote: “in all appearance those [shares] will run higher according to the fury 
that seem to be in the people. Our stock jobbers that are here can not well comprehend that 
matter.”19  The second stage was a mixture of incredulity, scepticism, and (for Mississippi 
shareholders) apprehension. This is well documented in the archival sources, for instance in an 
early November 1719 letter from the duke of Chandos to one of his agents in France: 
 
                                               
18 Dangeau, marquis de, Journal du marquis de Dangeau (Paris, 1860), XVIII, p. 74, 6 July 1719. 
19 National Archives, SP 78/165, 289, 17 October 1719, Crawford to Craggs. 
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I own, Chandos wrote, that I can’t but have a diffidence of that stock [Mississippi] & apprehend a sudden 
downfall. I don’t mean [that] it will come soon, but that whenever it do fall, [it] will go down at once, so 
that if it comes to a good handsome rise I shou’d not be in my own opinion for staying to the last.20  
 
The final stage – during the last leg of the Mississippi SMLV – looked like true amazement. 
Here too, the archival evidence is plentiful, for example in the press. Mid-November 1719, the 
London newspaper Daily Post wrote: “The actions [shares] of the Bank [Mississippi Company] 
are every day more and more the surprize of the world. The [stock] r[o]se last Saturday 
morning to 1800, and there is no question but it will be up in a day or two more at 2000.”21 A 
few days later, the Parisian informer of a Viennese newspaper reported: “the surge of the shares 
causes here, among persons of all conditions, an inexpressible amazement”.22  
Given the recent example of the Mississippi Bubble, the SMLVs of the South Sea Bubble 
probably caused relatively less surprise and amazement.23 Nonetheless, there is ample evidence 
that contemporaries were increasingly puzzled as the momentum of the English boom 
protracted itself. To give only one example, from February to June 1720, the London-based 
banker George Middleton repeated in his letters that it was “impossible” for the English stocks 
to “hold” at those increasingly higher levels they were reaching almost every day.24 Besides 
being a sceptic, he was also a “bear” (he was short the East India Company on behalf of John 
Law, the director of the Mississippi Company), so he was particularly distressed that the market 
was not behaving according to his forecasts. Late June (thirteen days before the peak in the 
South Sea and East India share prices), Middleton finally started to doubt his own scepticism. 
He wrote to Law: “I own I think ‘tis impossible this can hold, but yet so many miracles have 
happened of late, that confound my thoughts”.25 
To sum up, historical actors were astonished because stock prices were acting differently 
from what they were expecting. It was strange for them to see a market going almost only 
upwards, and shares raising so much in a single day. Middleton, to take this example, resorted 
to irrational thinking (a “miracle”) in the attempt of making sense of what was happening. Thus, 
we could say that the 1719-20 SMLVs represented a double anomaly: an anomaly in the eyes 
of contemporaries and an anomaly in the sense of an apparent contradiction (the so-called 
“momentum anomaly”) to the efficient-market hypothesis.26 May we say that the historical 
                                               
20 Huntington Library, Stowe 57, 16, f. 341, Chandos to Arbuthnot, 22 October 1719 (according to the Julian 
calendar, i.e. the 2nd November according to the Gregorian calendar: see below note 40). 
21 Daily Post, 17 November 1719. The date of the report sent from Paris was 22 November 1719. It is noteworthy 
that the author talks about the “actions” of the Bank, although the Bank and the Company were not yet officially 
merged in mid-November 1719. Yet, the confusion is understandable as they were both run by John Law. 
22 Corriere di Vienna, 16 December 1719. The date of the report sent from Paris was 27 November 1719. 
23 In March-April 1720, when the London SMLV was underway, the Parisian bubble had started to burst, but 
had not collapsed yet. 
24 Coutts Archives, Coutts Letter Book O 14, f. 65, 115, 148, and passim. 
25 Ibid. f. 235. 
26  About the efficient-market hypothesis and the “momentum anomaly” see in particular Jegadeesh, N. & 
Titman, S., “Returns to buying winners and selling losers: Implications for stock market efficiency”, The Journal of 
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actors themselves appeared to assume that the market would move according to what we would 
call today a “random walk”?27 Yes, at least in the first stages of the 1719-20 bubble. The bulk 
of evidence suggests that they did not expect to see any type of trend in the market; at least, any 
trend that might be foreseen. This view clearly emerges, for instance, in the duke of Chandos’ 
correspondence. For example in a letter (June 1720) to the marquis of Monteleon, a Spanish 
diplomat actively involved in the stock-jobbing of the successive bubbles: “The rise and fall of 
stocks, wrote Chandos, does not follow a logical reason (ne se règle pas selon la raison), but a certain 
whim of the people, a fatality that cannot be forecasted.”28 However, as his investing experience 
grew, Chandos started to think that it was possible to forecast the market, in particular market 
reaction to initial public offering of stocks. Writing to Richard Cantillon (August 1720), he 
declared: 
 
 I believe buying up subscriptions as soon as they come out & selling them at a reasonable profit is the 
surest was for getting, for all subscriptions rise upon their being first taken, though sometimes it lasts not 
long.”29 
 
 
4. The full toolbox  
The full toolbox that the paper applies is composed of two distinct sets of elements. The first set 
is simply the standard RSI equation together with the indicators originally developed by Wilder. 
In Wilder’s model, the most significant indicator is what he calls “divergence”. Divergence 
occurs when (at the top or bottom of the market) the price and the RSI move in opposite 
directions. Here is how Wilder describes this phenomenon:  
 
Although divergence does not occur at every turning point, it does occur at most significant turning points. 
When divergence begins to show up after a good directional move, this is a very strong indication that a 
turning point is near. Divergence is the single most indicative characteristic of the Relative Strength 
Index.30 
 
There are two opposite types of divergence. “Bearish divergence” happens when the price, in 
an uptrend, reaches a higher high while the RSI makes a lower high. As the name suggests, this 
                                               
finance, 48, 1, (1993); Barberis, N. et al., “A model of investor sentiment”, Journal of financial economics, 49, 3 (1998); 
Crombez, J., “Momentum, rational agents and efficient markets”, The Journal of Psychology and Financial Markets, 2, 
4 (2001). 
27 See Cootner, P. H., The random character of stock market prices (Cambridge MA, 1964); Malkiel, B. G., A random 
walk down Wall Street (New York, 1973). 
28 Huntington Library, Stowe 57, 17, f. 92. 1st June 1720. 
29 Ibid., f. 163, 25 August 1720. 
30 Wilder, J. W., New concepts, cit., p. 70. 
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is a bearish signal.31 “Bullish divergence” is the opposite: it happens when the price, in a 
downtrend, reaches a lower low while the RSI makes a higher low. As the name suggests, it is a 
bullish signal. Divergence may be complemented by a “failure swing”. In an uptrend, a failure 
swing occurs when the RSI fails to exceed its previous top, and then falls below the previous 
low. In a downtrend, it occurs when the RSI fails to exceed the previous low, and then rises 
above the previous high. According to Wilder, this is another strong indicator of market 
reversal.32 
The other set of tools does not come from Wilder: it is the original contribution of the paper, 
and I present it here for the first time. This is still a work in progress, with margins for 
improvement and possible further developments. The first key element in this new set is the 
concept of “strong momentum with low volatility” that we have described above. The second 
key element is the notion of accumulated momentum. I call accumulated upward momentum (AuM) the 
aggregate “overbought” RSI readings, that is to say daily RSI readings equal to or above 70; 
accumulated downward momentum (AdM) the aggregate “oversold” RSI readings (i.e. daily RSI 
readings equal to or below 30). 
 
AuM = sum of RSI readings ≥ 70 
AdM = sum of RSI readings ≤ 30 
 
Accumulated momentum is computed for a given asset and a given length of time. In order to 
compare different assets, the paper mostly calculates the AuM for the entire booming phase 
(from the previous low to the top in the price) and the AdM for the entire downfall (from the 
top to the trough in the price). When analysing chronological momentum distribution (see 
below section III-2), the paper computes and compares shorter sequences of AuM or AdM for 
one single asset. It compares, for example, the AuM in the early stage of the boom, from the 
AuM in the middle and late stages.  
The last two metrics that I have devised are the AuM/AdM and mP/AuM ratios. The 
AuM/AdM simply measures the ratio between the accumulated momentum during the boom 
and the accumulated momentum during the crash. The mP/AuM measures the ratio between 
the maximum percentage price increase during the boom (mP) and the accumulated 
momentum during the same boom. As we will see below, these two metrics generate interesting 
insights. It would be possible also to calculate the ratio between the maximum price decline 
during the crash and the AdM, but I keep this for a next paper.  
 
                                               
31 Practitioners pay particular attention to these decoupling between price and RSI. See for instance Brown, C., 
Technical analysis for the trading professional: (New York, 2011), p. 98; Di Lorenzo, R., Basic Technical Analysis of Financial 
Markets (New York, 2013), p. 146. 
32 Wilder, J. W., New concepts, cit., p. 68. 
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II. Using the toolbox to analyse 1719-20 markets 
 
MISSISSIPPI COMPANY 
Between August 1718 (first price data) and its peak (late December 1719), the Mississippi 
Company had an AuM of 1432; from the peak to the bottom (mid-January 1721) an AdM of 
412, giving an AuM/AdM ratio of 3.48. In other words, the accumulated strength of the 
upward momentum was more than three times larger than the strength of the downward 
momentum. 
The fantastic rise of the stock started in May 1719, but the first upward SMLV happened 
two months before. The RSI stayed above 70 for fifteen days (3-17 March 1719), with the stock 
nearly reaching par in cash terms. What may explain this first SMLV? In December 1718, the 
Mississippi Company had acquired the French Senegal Company, and as a result, had 
significantly enlarged its merchant fleet; ten ships, with soldiers and colonists, were sent to 
Louisiana. 33 Moreover, around March 1719, John Law demonstrated spectacularly his faith in 
the Mississippi Company by massively buying call options (with a strike price at par) on its 
shares. 34  These commercial developments and financial operations probably convinced 
investors that the corporation was significantly undervalued (the 3 March 1719, its stock was 
12% under par). 
Between May and August 1719, the Mississippi Company bought out the other French joint-
stock firms for overseas trade (Africa, Indies, and China Companies). It also took over the 
management of the royal mints and of most French taxes. Furthermore, in August, it launched 
the massive conversion of the whole French sovereign debt into its own stock. As a result, the 
corporation trebled its nominal capital with five successive shares issues.35 The second (12-29 
May) and third (17 Jun.-22 Sep.) SMLVs happened during that period. Interestingly, that third 
SMLV – that lasted for a record 98 days – ended on the eve of the two last shares issues (26 and 
28 September). On that 22 September 1719, the parabolic surge of Mississippi stock was only 
half way: the indexed price was then at 18.2 vs. 36.5 at the peak (end of December 1719). Yet, 
the accumulated upward momentum was already more than two-thirds of its way: the AuM 
was then at 959 vs. 1432 at the peak. In other words, the Mississippi Bubble constitutes an 
                                               
33 Velde, F., “Government Equity and Money: John Law’s System in 1720 France”, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
working papers (2004) provides one of the clearest overviews of the developments of the Mississippi Company. See 
also Faure, E., La banqueroute de Law (Paris, 1977) and Levasseur, E., Recherches historiques sur le système de Law (Paris, 
1854). 
34 Forbonnais, Duverger de, Recherches et considérations sur les finances de France (Bâle, 1758), VI, 286. 
35 Mid-June 1719, its nominal capital was 100,000,000 livres (L). Five successive arrêts of the Conseil d’État 
increased the firm’s capital: 20 June 1719 (25mL); 27 July (25mL); 13 September (50mL); 26 September (50mL); 
28 September (50mL). See Hautchamp, Marmont du, Histoire du système des finances (La Haye, 1739), V, n. 22, 27, 
34, 36, 37. 
 16 
example where the bulk of the upward momentum happened in the early phase of the boom 
rather than at the end (see below). 
The last SMLV lasted from 23 October to 9 December 1719. The 22 November, when the 
RSI peaked (94.6), but failed to exceed its previous high (95.16, reached the 12 Sep.), it signaled 
a potential “failure swing”. The failure swing was confirmed the 14 December 1719, as the RSI 
fell below it previous low (Figure 5).36 Furthermore, at the end of December, there was a bearish 
divergence between price and RSI: the former was still in an uptrend, while the latter was clearly 
in a downtrend. The 25 December, the price reached its apex, while the RSI was 65.86, which 
is to say below “overbought” territory.  
The bearish divergence anticipated the reversal in the price trend. However, the bubble did 
not burst immediately, as the company officially supported its share price for several months. 
The crash happened the 22 May 1720, following a royal arrêt that officially reduced the value 
of the shares by almost a half. Such was the public outrage, that the government was forced to 
back down. The 25 May, the arrêt was rescinded; the 27 May, the regent placed John Law under 
house arrest. That decision generated a major panic in the market. From the 20 to the 27 May, 
the Mississippi share dropped by 17%; in the four days after Law’s downfall, it collapsed by 
another 45%. The 1st of June, Law was freed and back in command of French finances. His 
reputation had been seriously tarnished, yet his comeback provoked a (momentarily) rebound 
in the stock. The RSI stayed under 30 during the whole crisis. But as the crisis lasted less than 
fifteen days, the May 1720 panic, in spite of its severity, did not qualify for our definition of a 
downward SMLV. 
 
 
                                               
36 About the sudden fall of the Mississippi stock mid-December 1719, see Faure, E., La Banqueroute, cit., p. 238. 
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Figure 4. Mississippi Company price and RSI (6 Aug. 1718-31 Jan. 1721)37 
 
The Mississippi stock, which was not supported anymore, entered a prolonged downtrend. Late 
September, following some new bold measures introduced by Law, the RSI spiked above 70 for 
a few days.38 In October, there was an apparent bullish divergence (the RSI making a higher 
low, while the price was making a lower low) that marked a possible trend reversal. Yet, the 
price resumed its gradual decline, until December 1720, when it crashed for the second time. 
The second crash, as the first one, was directly connected to Law’s downfall. By the 11 
December he had lost his position (this time definitely), and the RSI fell below 30 on that same 
day. There was no bullish divergence, with the RSI and the price reaching the bottom the 23 
December 1720, one day after Law had fled France (and probably the same day when the news 
of his departure reached Paris). Hence, the RSI confirms how much the Mississippi Bubble was 
connected to John Law himself. There is probably no other example of a major market boom 
or bust that is, to such an extent, related to a single individual. 
The RSI stayed below 30 for more than one month, until the 15 January 1721. Thus, the 
collapse of the Mississippi Bubble lasted one year (from 25 Dec. 1719 to 23 Dec. 1720), and the 
only downward SMLV occurred at the very end.  
  
 
                                               
37 Source: single series of the Mississippi Company share developed by François Velde (private communication), 
reviewed by myself on the basis of further archival material (price quotes). 
38 Faure, E., La Banqueroute, cit., p. 509, has called these measures Law’s “chef-d’oeuvre méconnu” (unknown 
masterpiece). 
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Figure 5. Mississippi Company (Aug. 1719-Jan. 1720): failure swing and bearish divergence 
 
 
SOUTH SEA COMPANY 
Between May 1719 and late December 1720, the South Sea Company had an AuM of 895 and 
an AdM of 392. This was 5% less AdM than the Mississippi Company, but also one third less 
AuM. Accordingly, the English giant corporation had a significantly lower AuM/AdM ratio 
than its French counterpart (2.28 vs. 3.48). It had also a much lower ratio than the overall 
London index (10.01).39 
From May to November 1719, while the French equity market was booming, the South Sea 
stock was still going through a period of weak momentum. The harbinger of the coming bubble 
occurred the 14 November 1719 (Julian calendar, 25 Nov. in our Gregorian calendar40), when 
the RSI crossed the overbought line and stayed above there for a few days. The South Sea stock 
had not raised much since its floatation in 1711; this was possibly the first time its RSI went 
above 70. That 14 November marked the beginning of secret negotiations between the South 
Sea Company and the British government, negotiations that led to the South Sea scheme 
officially presented to the Parliament two months later.41 Since W. R. Scott, scholars have 
supposed that people in the know had been buying South Sea shares, expecting that these 
                                               
39 See below. 
40 Britain used at the time the Julian calendar, which was eleven days behind our own calendar (Gregorian). The 
historiography about the South Sea Bubble mostly quotes dates according to the Julian calendar. 
41 [Blunt, J.], A true state of the South Sea Scheme (London, 1720), p. 1; Carswell, J., The South Sea Bubble (London, 
1960), p. 99. 
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negotiations would benefit the firm.42 The RSI confirms that the market – whoever was behind 
it – instantly and enthusiastically reacted to the secret talks. 
The RSI spiked several times above 70 in December 1719, yet the first upward SMLV 
happened only mid-January 1720. Interestingly, that first SMLV ended right before the scheme 
was officially submitted to the South Sea board and to the Parliament (21-22 Jan. Julian). 
According to P. G. M. Dickson, the South Sea share experienced three major rises: in the second 
half of March second half of May, and during June 1720 (Julian).43 The RSI presents a partially 
different reading of the boom. There were five upward SMLVs: the first in January, the second 
in February (Feb.-Mar. Gregorian), the third in March-April, the fourth and longest (21 days) 
in May-June, and the last in June-July (July Greg.) The RSI reached its top (96.16) the 2nd June 
(13 Jul. Greg.), while the price peaked the 29 June (10 Jul. Greg.)44 There was, therefore, a 
bearish divergence. However, the 29 June, the RSI was still extremely high (87.18), which 
means that the divergence was much less marked in comparison to the Mississippi stock.  
As the share collapsed, there was only one long downward SMLV, lasting more than one 
month, from 12 September to 18 October 1720 (23 Sep.-29 Oct. Greg.) The RSI was at its 
lowest (11.98) the 28 September (9 Oct. Greg.) The price, on the other hand, found a bottom 
the 13 December 1720 (24 Dec. Greg.) There was, therefore, a bullish divergence from early 
October to December. The South Sea and the Mississippi stock bottomed almost the same day. 
They also experienced a concomitant bullish divergence in October (although, in the Mississippi 
case, it turned out to be a failed divergence). 
 
                                               
42 Scott, W. R., The constitution and finance of English, Scottish, and Irish joint-stock companies to 1720, (Cambridge, 1911), 
III, p. 304. 
43 Dickson, P. G. M., The financial revolution in England (London, 1967), p. 140. 
44 The South Sea transfer books were closed the 23 June for the summer, and the peak from 24 to 29 June was 
due to the shift from spot to forward prices. See L. Neal, The rise of financial capitalism (Cambridge, 1990), p. 101. 
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Figure 6. South Sea Company price and RSI (12 May 1719-31 Dec. 1720 Greg.) 
 
 
BANK OF ENGLAND 
Between May 1719 and late December 1720, the Bank of England (BoE) had an AuM of 389 
and AdM of 246, that is to say only 40% of the South Sea AuM, and yet 63% of its AdM. As a 
result, the BoE had a lower AuM/AdM ratio (1.62 vs. 2.28). 
The BoE’s RSI surged above 70 the 26 November 1719 (Julian), two weeks after the South 
Sea. This first spike of the RSI supports the hypothesis, formulated by some scholars, that the 
Bank was also involved in the secret negotiations between the South Sea Company and the 
government (see above).45 There was a second RSI spike early January 1720, which did not last 
long enough to constitute an upward SMLV. The BoE experienced only one uSMLV, in May-
June 1720. The RSI was at its highest (90.50) the 21 May; the price peaked the 23 June (4 Jul. 
Greg.), with a RSI still above 70. There was therefore a bearish divergence (not marked on the 
chart). 
On the downside, the BoE went through a shorter dSMLV (in Sep.-Oct. 1720) compared to 
the South Sea, but its RSI reached a lower low (6.17 vs. 11.98), and it bottomed more than two 
weeks later (15 Oct. vs. 28. Sep.) The price of the two stocks, however, bottomed the same day 
(13 Dec. 1720). From October, the BoE was thus in a bullish divergence, with the RSI trending 
upward and the price still trending downward.  
 
 
                                               
45 Scott, W. R., The constitution and finance, cit., III, p. 204 and 304; Clapham, J. H., The Bank of England: a history 
(1694-1797) (Cambridge, 1958) p. 83. 
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Figure 7. Bank of England price and RSI (12 May 1719-31 Dec. 1720 Greg.) 
 
 
EAST INDIA COMPANY 
The East India Company (EIC) had the lowest AuM/AdM ratio (1.27) among all the English 
stocks. Between May 1719 and late December 1720, it had an AuM of 364 and an AdM of 287. 
Compared to the BoE, the EIC had less upward momentum and more downward momentum. 
The RSI of the EIC spiked above 70 the 15 November 1719 (Julian), around the same time 
when it was also spiking for the South Sea and the BoE.46 After other upward spikes in January, 
February, March, and May, the EIC entered an uSMLV in June 1720. The RSI reached the 
top (88.16) very early on, the 21 March, two months before the BoE and the South Sea. On the 
contrary, the EIC price peaked (29 Jun.) around the same time as the two other “moneyed” 
companies. There was, therefore, a prolonged bearish divergence between March and June (not 
marked on the chart). 
The EIC experienced a dSMLV (Sep. 1719), shorter than the South Sea, and of a similar 
length than the BoE. The RSI bottomed (10.06) the 22 September, a week before the South 
Sea and three weeks before the BoE. The price bottomed the same day (13 Dec. 1720) as the 
two other stocks. There was, therefore, a long bullish divergence between October and 
December. 
 
                                               
46 This spike in the RSI supports the hypothesis that the EIC was also involved in the secret negotiations (see 
above). 
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Figure 8. East India Company price and RSI (12 May 1719-31 Dec. 1720 Greg.) 
 
 
THE MILLION BANK 
The Million Bank is generally not considered a major actor of the 1720 bubble. Yet, among all 
the stocks analyzed here, it achieved the highest score in terms of accumulated momentum, 
both on the upside (2,014), and on the upside (1,101). Compared to the South Sea, its AuM was 
128% higher and its AdM 180% higher. The AuM/AdM (1.85) was therefore lower than the 
South Sea, although it was higher than the BoE and EIC.  
The Million Bank was a virtual investment fund in government securities. As such, it was 
supposed to benefit from the sovereign debt-to-equity swap implemented by the South Sea 
Company. Moreover, during the boom, the Million Bank borrowed large sums from the South 
Sea and used them to buy even more South Sea stock.47 The Million Bank had two uSMLVs: 
one in February-March and the other in May-July 1720 (Julian), which lasted 51 days. Its RSI 
peaked (9 June) twenty days before the South Sea, with the exceptionally high reading of 99.92; 
the price peaked the 22 June, four days before the South Sea. W. R. Scott writes that the Million 
Bank was “remarkably fortunate in escaping from being involved in the collapse of the South 
Sea”, and he adds “Evidently the directors had withdrawn from speculation in good time”.48 
The RSI, however, tells a different narrative. Although the price remained rather stable until 
September 1720, the RSI started to collapse immediately after the peak in the South Sea. The 
firm experienced two dSMLVs (in Sep.-Oct. and in Nov.-Dec. 1720), which suggest that it was 
in fact heavily involved in the South Sea crash. The RSI bottomed (4.41) the 13 October, but 
the price was still falling end of December 1720, and it probably only bottomed early 1721.  
                                               
47 Scott, W. R., The constitution and finance, cit., p. 285. 
48 Ibid., p. 286. 
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Figure 9. Million Bank price and RSI (13 Nov. 1719-31 Dec. 1720 Greg.) 
 
THE ROYAL AFRICAN COMPANY 
The Royal African Company (RAC) held the record of the highest AuM/AdM: 10.68, meaning 
that the accumulated strength of the upward momentum was more than ten times larger than 
the strength of the downward momentum. On the upside, its AuM (801) was not too far from 
the South Sea or the marine insurance firms (see below); on the downside, the RAC had the 
lowest AdM (75) among all the stocks analyzed in this paper. 
The RAC had a first uSMLV in August 1719, with a further spike of the RSI the 9 
September (Julian).49 There were three other uSMLVs: the first in February-March, the second 
in March-April, and the third in May-June 1720. The February SMLV was clearly connected 
to the scheme to recapitalize the company, presented by a syndicate led by the duke of 
Chandos.50 The RSI (96.34) and the price peaked on the same day, 2 June 1720. Thus, there 
was no bearish divergence. Afterwards, the RSI fell much faster than the price. Yet, there was 
only one dSMLV (Sep. 1720). The RSI bottomed (16.13) the 21 September; the price bottomed 
the 17 November 1719, almost one month before the South Sea. Between September and 
November, the RAC was therefore in a bullish divergence. 
 
                                               
49 In a coming paper, based on new archival evidence, I present a possible explanation for this first uSMLV of 
the RAC.  
50 In Chandos correspondence, the scheme about the new RAC is mentioned for the first time the 22 February 
1720 (Julian): Huntington Library, Stowe 57, 17, f. 23. 
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Figure 10. Royal African Company price and RSI (21 Aug. 1719-31 Dec. 1720 Greg.) 
 
 
ENGLISH MARINE INSURANCE FIRMS 
The two marine insurance firms, the Royal Exchange Assurance and the London Assurance, 
followed a parallel course during the 1720 bubble. It makes sense, therefore, to consider them 
as a group. Their AuM (877) was slightly lower than the South Sea, with a much lower AdM 
(110). The AuM/AdM ratio (7.97) was much higher; it was second only to the RAC and the 
London index (see below). 
The marine insurance firms’ RSI spiked repeatedly over 70, but it had only one uSMLV, 
which lasted 46 straight days, from late April to early June 1720 (Julian). Contrarily to all the 
other English stocks examined here, there was no bearish divergence: the RSI and price peaked 
the same day, 15 August 1720 (one month and a half after the South Sea price had peaked). 
There was no plateau at the summit, with the price and RSI collapsing in parallel. The RSI 
downfall was brief. It had already bottomed the 19 September 1720, ten days before the South 
Sea, and what is more with a much higher reading (21.71 vs. 11.98 for the South Sea). There 
was, nonetheless, a downward SMLV from 9 to 29 September. The price bottomed the 17 
December 1720, which meant a bullish divergence between September and December. 
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Figure 11. Two marine insurance firms price and RSI (10 Jan.-31 Dec. 1720 Greg.) 
 
 
LONDON INDEX A 
The London index A is an equally-weighted basket of seven stocks: South Sea Company, BoE, 
EIC, Million Bank, RAC, and the two marine insurance firms, the Royal Exchange Assurance 
and the London Assurance.51 From January 1720 on, these were the stocks regularly quoted in 
the newspapers, both English and foreign. It is thus possible to consider that these seven stocks 
were the most heavily traded throughout 1720. Hence, they represent the best possible proxy 
for the whole London equity market. The London index AuM was 1,121; the AdM was 117. 
Its AuM/AdM ratio (9.58) was four times higher than the South Sea, although smaller than the 
RAC. 
There were four upward SMLV: the first in February, the second and longest (50 days) from 
late April to early June, the third in June-early July, and the last in late July 1720 (Julian). The 
RSI was already at its zenith the 23 May (97.62), two days after the BoE, before the South Sea, 
and much before the marine insurance firms. The price peaked the 15 August, two days after 
the marine stocks. There was therefore a protracted bearish divergence, from May to August. 
Price and RSI fell sharply after mid-August, with the RSI bottoming (17.38) the 29 September 
1720, one day after the South Sea. The only dSMLV took place in September. October-
                                               
51 The price of the seven stocks is indexed with 10 January 1720 (first quotation for the two marine insurance 
firms) as the starting value. The basket is calculated adding, for each trading day, the normalized value of each 
stock, and then dividing the sum by 7. In other words, using percentage change in each stock, and then averaging. 
Missing data (e.g. for the Bank of England the 4 March 1720) is extrapolated on the basis of the previous and 
following available prices.   
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December was a time of bullish divergence, with the price bottoming the 17 December 1720, 
the same day as the marine insurance firms, and four days after the South Sea. 
 
 
Figure 12. London index A price and RSI (10 Jan.-31 Dec. 1720 Greg.) 
 
 
LONDON INDEX B 
London index B is built according to the same principles as index A. The only difference is that 
index B starts earlier. From 21 August 1719 to 12 November 1719, index B is composed of four 
stocks: South Sea Company, BoE, EIC, and RAC;52 from 13 November 1719, the Million Bank 
is added to the basket; from 10 January 1720, index B is the same as index A, i.e. composed of 
the above-mentioned stocks plus the two marine insurance firms. To facilitate comparisons with 
index A, the indexed price is unchanged, with 10 January 1720 representing 1. Index B thus 
starts with a price of 0.82. The AdM (117) was the same as index A; the AuM (1,190 vs. 1,121) 
was higher, as the RSI spiked above 70 in September and December 1719. The AuM/AdM 
was higher (10.17 vs. 9.58), second only to the RAC. 
 
 
                                               
52 No prices were available for the three other stocks during that period.  
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Figure 13. London index B price and RSI (21 Aug. 1719-31 Dec. 1720 Greg.) 
 
 
DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY 
The Dutch East India Company (VOC) was the only stock in this study with a negative net 
accumulated momentum. Between 16 November 1719 and 31 December 1720, the AuM was 
90, slightly lower than the AdM (96). The VOC also had the lowest AuM/AdM ratio (0.94) 
among all the stock analyzed in this paper.  
Notwithstanding its low AuM score, the VOC went through a 40-days long uSMLV in April-
May 1720. In fact, all the RSI readings above 70 were concentrated during that period. The 
RSI was at its apex (80.39) the 29 April, more than three months before the apex in the price 
(12 August). When the price reached the top, the RSI had already spent 94 days under the 70 
threshold. The VOC and the Mississippi Company were the two only examples, in this paper, 
of stocks that reached their top with a RSI that was not in overbought territory. On the 
downside, there was a 38-day dSMLV (Oct.-Nov. 1720). The RSI bottomed (19.11) the 16 
October, earlier than the price (9 Nov. 1720), giving rise to a short bullish divergence. 
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Figure 14. Dutch East India Company price and RSI (16 Nov. 1719-31 Dec. 1720) 
 
 
DUTCH WEST INDIA COMPANY 
Between 16 November 1719 and 31 December 1720, the Dutch West India Company (WIC) 
had an AuM of 346 (almost four times larger than the VOC) and an AdM of 92 (smaller than 
the VOC). The AuM/AdM ratio (3.84) was much higher than the VOC (0.94), but also higher 
than the Mississippi (3.48) and South Sea (2.2).  
There was a first RSI spike above 70 in April 1720, which would need to be explained. The 
second spike in June and the uSMLV in July-September were certainly connected to the marine 
insurance schemes and the other ambitious financial projects in which the WIC was involved.53 
Price and RSI (92.2) reached the top the same day (28 August 1720). There was, therefore, no 
bearish divergence. In fact, the WIC peaked exactly two days after the peak in the English 
marine insurance stocks (15 Aug. Julian, 26 Aug. Greg.), which seems a further confirmation 
that the WIC boom was connected to a marine-insurance narrative.54 On the downside, the 
WIC experienced a prolonged dSMLV that started in October and was still going on late 
December. The RSI, however, was at its nadir (19.73) already the 28 October. There was 
therefore a two-month bullish divergence, with the price bottoming the 18 December 1720. 
 
                                               
53 See Gelderblom, O. & Jonker, J. “Mirroring different follies. The character of the 1720 Bubble in the Dutch 
Republic”, in C. Labio et al. (eds), The “Great Mirror of Folly”: Finance, Culture, and the Crash of 1720 (New Haven, 
2013).  
54 See Frehen, R.G.P., et al., “New evidence on the first financial bubble”,  Journal of Financial Economics, 108 
(2013). About news circulation between London and Amsterdam: Koudjis, P., “The boats that did not sail: Asset 
price volatility in a natural experiment”, The Journal of Finance, 71, 3 (2016). 
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Figure 15. West India Company price and RSI (16 Nov. 1719-31 Dec. 1720) 
 
 
AMSTERDAM INDEX 
The Amsterdam index is an equally weighted basket of two stocks: VOC and WIC.55 There is 
little doubt that these were the most heavily traded stocks on the Dutch equity market. Among 
other things, between November 1719 and December 1720, they were the only Dutch stocks 
regularly quoted in the Dutch press.56 Thus, the index represents the best possible proxy for the 
whole Amsterdam equity market.  
Between November 1719 and December 1720, the Amsterdam index had an AuM of 547 
(less than half compared to the London index) and an AdM of 97 (17% less than the London 
index). Accordingly, the AuM/AdM ratio (5.64) was much lower than that of the London index, 
but higher than the Mississippi Company. Interestingly, the ratio was also higher than that of 
the two underlying stocks, WIC and the VOC.  
The index had three uSMLVs: the first in January, the second in February-March, and the 
third (and longest: 61 straight days) in July-September 1720. There was no bearish divergence, 
as price and RSI (80.90) peaked the same day, 28 August (which was also the peak for the WIC). 
On the downside, there was one dSMLV in October-November 1720. The RSI bottomed 
(18.78) the 28 October, twelve days after the VOC and the same day as the WIC. The price, 
on the other hand, found a bottom the 19 December, although it is possible that it fell even 
further early 1721. There was, thus, a bullish divergence in November and December 1720. 
                                               
55 The basket is calculated according to the same method used for the London index (see above): calculating the 
percentage change for each stock, and then averaging by two. 
56 A dozen other stocks, such as Stad Rotterdam, were also quoted, but just for a few months: not enough time 
to calculate a RSI.  
 30 
 
 
Figure 16. Amsterdam index price and RSI (16 Nov. 1719-31 Dec. 1720) 
 
 
LISBON ON LONDON EXCHANGE RATE 
Between early March and late December 1720, the Lisbon on London exchange rate had an 
AuM of 37 and no AdM. Thus, the AuM/AdM ratio cannot be calculated. The momentum of 
the Portuguese exchange rate is not fully comparable to the stocks analyzed here, not so much 
because of the difference in asset class, but rather because it is based on much fewer daily data.57 
Nonetheless, some comparisons are possible, in particular concerning the SMLV. 
The exchange rate briefly spiked above 70 late June 1720, presumably around the time when 
the Portuguese crown started to seriously consider the possibility of granting a charter to a Brazil 
Company.58 The second RSI spike (mid-August) and the uSMLV (late Aug.-early Sep.) were 
also clearly connected to further Portuguese joint-stock schemes that were discussed around that 
time. Anticipating a possible initial public offering of shares, international investors sent large 
sums to Lisbon. These massive inflows of capital left a huge “signature” in the exchange rate 
and they explain why there was an uSMLV. The apex in the exchange rate and the apex in the 
RSI (79.99) happened the same day, 3 September 1720. There was no sharp decline afterwards, 
possibly because discussions about a possible Portuguese firm dragged for the next months and 
                                               
57 Less daily data means that the AuM is mechanically lower. In the FGR 1720 price database, there are prices about 
exchange rates approximately every six-eight days, compared to every one-two days in the case of stocks. Using 
the Course of Exchange – that has data approximately every two days – it would be possible to calculate a more 
accurate AuM. 
58 The first detailed project for a Brazil Company was discussed in the summer 1720: Condorelli, S., “The 1719-
20 stock euphoria: a pan-European perspective”, MPRA Paper (2016).  
 31 
years. The RSI never reached oversold conditions, but bottomed (46.47) the same day as the 
exchange rate, 1 November 1720. 
 
 
Figure 17. Lisbon on London exchange rate (1st Mar.-20 Dec. 1720) 
 
 
CADIZ ON LONDON EXCHANGE RATE 
Between early March and late December 1720, the Cadiz on London exchange rate had an 
AuM of 11 (less than one third of the Lisbon exchange rate) and an AdM of 31. The AuM/AdM 
ratio was 0.35. 
The RSI spiked a first time above 70 in March 1720. The only plausible explanation for this 
first boom is the reopening of trade between Spain and its former enemies (Britain, the Dutch 
Republic, and France) after the end of the War of the Quadruple Alliance (Feb. 1720). This was 
followed by a dSMLV in April-May. Then, the RSI spiked again above 70 in June, July, and 
August, at a time when the government in Madrid was evaluating various schemes for a Spanish 
joint-stock corporation.59 The RSI peaked (74.81) the 28 June, two months before the top in 
the exchange rate. Contrarily to the Portuguese case, there was no SMLV. There was rather a 
bearish divergence in August-September, as the RSI declined rapidly below 70, while the 
exchange rate was hovering at its maximum level between. The exchange fell sharply in late 
September, once it became clear that the crown had rejected all the projects. Yet, the RSI never 
reached oversold level. Therefore, considering only the momentum connected to speculation 
about a possible joint-stock scheme (i.e. not the period before June), the AuM was 11 and there 
was no AdM. 
 
                                               
59 Condorelli, S., “The 1719-20 stock euphoria”, cit. 
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Figure 18. Cadiz on London exchange rate (1st Mar.-20 Dec. 1720) 
 
 
 
III. Extending the analysis 
We saw that the RSI operates at two different levels. On the one hand, it sheds light on the 
dynamic followed by a certain stock, index, or exchange rate. On the other hand, it constitutes 
a tool to compare these financial instruments: as the RSI is normalized (0-100 range), it 
represents a much better element of comparison than the price itself. This section will extend 
the analysis in five ways: 1) it will sketch some further comparisons; 2) it will develop a method 
(the chronological distribution of momentum) to explore the dynamic of some indexes; 3) it will 
study how RSI divergence can serve both as a tool for comparison and individual analysis; 4) it 
will consider the relationship between the SMLV and the Minsky-Kindleberger’s notion of 
euphoria; 5) finally, it will investigate how momentum might explain  why equity booms spread 
from one country to the other in 1719-20. 
 
1. Comparisons 
The most basic comparison is simply visual: plotting together the RSI graphs of different assets. 
For example, Figure 19 shows the RSI of the South Sea Company, BoE, and EIC between 
September and December 1719. The three RSI followed a rather parallel course from 
September to mid-November, reaching a bottom the very same day, 11 November (31 Oct. 
Julian). The co-movement between the South Sea Company and the EIC broke apart exactly 
at the start of the secret negotiations (25 Nov. Greg, 14 Nov. Julian) between the South Sea 
directors and the British government. By contrast, from early December, the RSI of the South 
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Sea and the BoE were again moving in parallel. This parallelism supports W. R. Scott’s 
hypothesis that the secret negotiations also involved the BoE.60 
 
 
Figure 19. Comparing the RSI of the South Sea, BoE, and EIC (Sep.-Dec. 1719 Greg.) 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Upward and downward SMLVs in Paris, London, Amsterdam, and Lisbon (Mar. 1719-Dec. 1720) 
 
Other example, Figure 20 depicts the SMLV (both upward and downward) of the Paris, London 
and Amsterdam index, together with the Portuguese exchange rate. As such, it constitutes a 
chronological image of the four bubbles. The graph indicates the highest (or lowest) number 
                                               
60 See above. 
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reached by the RSI. For example, in the last uSMLV of the Paris index, the RSI reached 94; 
in the first dSMLV, the RSI bottomed at 6. 
The AuM and AdM metrics offer a different comparative perspective. Table 2 displays the 
AuM and AdM of the stocks, indexes, and exchange rates studied in this paper. The table 
appears to confirm what scholars have long supposed: that speculation was more overheated in 
Paris than in London, and in London than in Amsterdam. Indeed, the Paris index had an 
accumulated upward momentum (1,432) significantly larger than London (1,190), and much 
larger than Amsterdam (547). On the other hand, the table contains several surprises. Who 
would have imagined that the Million Bank (generally considered a sort of “risk-free” asset)61 
had generated an accumulated upward momentum (2,042) so much larger than any other 
English stock, including the South Sea (895)? Or that the VOC suffered more downward 
momentum (96) that the WIC (90) during the crash, although it had attracted much less 
speculative interest during the boom?  
Extending the analysis across different centuries, it is remarkable that the AuM of the most 
famous bubbles were quite comparable: the Mississippi Bubble (1,432),62 the South Sea Bubble 
(1,171)63, the bubble that led to the 1929 crash (1,586),64 and the dot-com bubble (1,425).65 The 
time length of these booms differed significantly: approximately one year in the Mississippi and 
South Sea cases, approximately six years in the 1920s and dot-com cases. In spite of this 
difference, and in spite of all sort of other dissimilarities (technological, cultural, political, etc.), 
the accumulated upward momentum of these booms was surprisingly similar. How shall we 
interpret this finding? Do all the major historical booms fall in the 1100-1600 AuM range? I 
will investigate these questions in the second paper. For now, let us note that AuM of the current 
US equity boom (1,207) 1171 falls perfectly into the said range.66 This would suggest that the 
current bull market might still have some room to go, but that it is definitely not in its infancy, 
as some market analysts argue. 
The AuM/AdM ratio underlines that there is not necessarily symmetry between upward and 
downward momentum (Table 3). As noted above, the South Sea stock had one third less AuM 
than the Mississippi, but only 5% less AdM. As a result, the Mississippi had a higher ratio (3.48) 
compared to the South Sea (2.28). There were also cases of stocks having both more AuM and 
less AdM than others, such as the WIC compared to the VOC.  
The AuM/AdM ratio introduces an interesting element of continuity and resilience into the 
notion of momentum. Let us imagine two stocks that have the same AuM during a bubble. 
Stock A was a fad: investors, which were eager to buy it, become eager to sell it (strong AdM) 
                                               
61 See Scott, W. R., Constitution, cit., III, pp.  279-289; Neal, L., Rise of Financial Capitalism, cit., p. 51. 
62 The Mississippi stock may be considered as the equivalent of the Paris index (as this was the only traded stock 
in Paris between September 1719 and May 1720). 
63 This is not the AuM of the South Sea stock itself, but of the London index B.  
64 This is the AuM of the DJIA from the major previous trough (Nov. 1923) to the top in Sep. 1929. 
65 The AuM of the Nasdaq from the major previous trough (Mar. 1994) to the top (Mar. 2000). 
66 DJIA, calculated from the trough of the market (March 2009) to 12 January 2018 (time of writing). 
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during the crash. Stock B may have started as a fad, yet (for some reason) the crash does not 
destroy investors’ expectations: they are not eager to sell it (weak AdM). The continuity in 
investors’ expectation in the case of stock B, that is to say the greater resilience of stock B during 
the crash, translates into a higher AuM/AdM compared to stock A. Another display of 
resilience would be the case of stock A and stock B having a similar AdM during the crash, 
although stock A had a much stronger AuM during the boom. It is noteworthy, for instance, 
that this seems to have been the case for the Mississippi compared to the South Sea, resulting 
in a significantly higher AuM/AdM for the French firm (Table 2 and Table 3). 
 
 
Table 2. AuM and AdM 
 AuM AdM 
Mississippi Company (Paris index) 1,432 412 
South Sea Company 895 392 
BoE 398 246 
EIC 364 287 
Million Bank 2,042 1101 
RAC 801 75 
Marine insurance firms 877 110 
London index A 1,121 117 
London index B 1,190 117 
VOC 90 96 
WIC 346 90 
Amsterdam index 547 97 
Lisbon on London exch. rate 37 0 
Cadiz on London exch. rate 11 0 
 
 
Exploring the reasons that would explain the differences in AuM/AdM of the 1720 stocks is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Two comments, nevertheless. The first concerns the WIC. Some 
scholars consider that the boom in the WIC’s price was probably the result of a manipulation 
of the market engineered by the firm’s directors.67 If the strong AuM had solely been the 
consequence of market manipulation, there would have been in all likelihood a backlash during 
the crash, and thus a comparable (if not stronger) AdM. Yet, investors were less eager to sell the 
WIC than its larger (and historically much more successful) sister, the VOC. The high 
AuM/AdM ratio of the WIC does not support the market manipulation thesis; it suggests that 
1720 events genuinely improved (at least for a time) investors’ expectations towards the 
company. It is remarkable that the WIC had also a higher AuM/AdM than the Mississippi and 
the South Sea. The second comment concerns the London and Amsterdam indexes. It is 
noteworthy that they both had a much higher AuM/AdM ratio than their underlying stocks.68 
                                               
67 Gelderblom, O. & Jonker, J. “Mirroring different follies”, cit.  
68 With the exception of the RAC in the case of the London index. 
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What was the reason for this difference? A hypothesis, that would need further investigation, 
would be that the higher ratio of the indexes was the result of their diversification. 
The last interesting metric is the ratio between the maximum percentage price increase (mP) 
during the boom and the AuM. The ratio highlights that some financial instruments 
“consumed” – in proportion of their maximum price increase – more upward momentum than 
others (Table 3). If we may draw a parallel with the notion of energy efficiency – and considering 
momentum as a form of “energy” – we may say that some financial instruments were more 
“efficient” than others. The higher the ratio, the greater was the “AuM efficiency”. With its low 
AuM, and 9.55 ratio, the Cadiz-on-London exchange rate was the lowest consumer of 
momentum-energy. By contrast, given its exceptionally high AuM, and its 0.18 ratio, the 
Million Bank was a heaviest consumer. Compared to the South Sea, the Million Bank’s AuM 
was 128% higher, although the price rose 56% less. The case of the marine insurance firms was 
the opposite: they had a lower AuM than the South Sea, and yet their price raised 240% more. 
This translated in a mP/AuM ratio of 3.23 vs. 0.94 for the South Sea. 
 
Table 3. AuM/AdM and mP/AuM 
 AuM/AdM mP/AuM69 
RAC 10.68 1.98 
London index B 10.17 0.96 
London index A 9.58 0.90 
Marine insurance firms 7.97 3.23 
Amsterdam index 5.64 0.80 
WIC 3.84 2.13 
Mississippi Company (Paris index) 3.48 2.55 
South Sea Company 2.28 0.94 
Million Bank 1.85 0.18 
BoE  1.62 0.47 
EIC 1.27 0.59 
VOC 0.94 1.49 
Lisbon on London exch. rate NA 2.81 
Cadiz on London exch. rate NA 9.55 
 
 
Table 4. AuM and mP/AuM of three U.S. equity booms 
 AuM mP/AuM 
1929 bubble (DJIA) 1,586 0.27 
dot-com bubble (Nasdaq) 1,425 0.48 
current bull market (DJIA)70  1,171 0.21 
 
 
                                               
69 The formula of the ratio is: (maxP/AuM) x 100. 
70 At the time of writing, 12 January 2018. 
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Interestingly, the mP/AuM ratio offers an inverted perspective on the Paris-London-
Amsterdam hierarchy in terms of overheated speculation (see above). In fact, proportionally to 
its maximum price increase, Paris “consumed” less AuM than London, and London less than 
Amsterdam. The Paris index had a much higher ratio (2.55) than London (0.90) and 
Amsterdam (0.80). Enlarging the perspective, the 1719-20 bubbles overall were significantly 
more “AuM efficient” compared to the U.S. market booms of the 20th and 21st century. The 
mP/AuM ratio of the dot-com bubble was 0.48; it was 0.27 for the 1929 bubble, and only 0.21 
for the current U.S. bull market (Table 4). In other words, the 1719-20 Paris bubble consumed, 
in proportion, five times less AuM than the dot-com bubble and almost ten times less than the 
1929 bubble. [I am still not sure how to interpret all this]. 
 
 
2. Momentum distribution during the lifecycle of the booms 
Turning to the individual asset level, the RSI sheds light on an important topic: the distribution 
of momentum during the lifecycle of the boom and burst. This paper only focuses on the upward 
phases, keeping for a next study the analysis of the crashes. 
Figure 21 represents the distribution of the upward momentum during the boom of the 
London index A. Over the whole period, the AuM was 1,121, while the indexed price rose from 
1.0 (10 Jan. 1720) to 10.73 (28 Aug. 1720). The figure breaks down the AuM for each new 
round number that the price reached: 280 AuM points were “consumed” as the price climbed 
from 1 (10 Jan.) to 2 (5 May); 290 points as the price rose from 2 to 3 (29 May); 76 points as it 
rose from 3 to 4 (1st June); etc. Obviously, the distribution reflects the underlying arithmetic 
progression of the price: the price doubled from 1 to 2; it only increased by 50% from 2 to 3; 
etc. Yet, it is clear that the distribution of momentum was not linear. In particular, there was a 
peak in momentum as the price jumped from 4 (1st June) to 5 (10 June). 
 
 
Figure 21. Price-based distribution of the AuM during the boom of the London index A 
 38 
 
Figure 22 highlights the non-linear character of the AuM distribution during the London index 
boom. The AuM graph represents the daily RSI readings above 70. For example, the 3 June 
(23 May Julian) the RSI was 97.62: it reads on the graph as a 27.62 value; the 8 June the RSI 
was 84.12: it reads as 14.12, etc. The figure shows different things: a) there were several clusters 
of AuM distributed all along the boom; b) there was an AuM peak in the early phase (Feb.-
Mar.) and another one in the last stage (August) of the boom; c) the bulk of the AuM took place 
in the middle stage (May-June), at a time when the price was rising extremely fast. 
 
 
Figure 22. Chronological AuM distribution: boom of the London index A 
 
The marine insurance firms (Figure 23) had a chronological AuM distribution remarkably 
similar to the London index. The Mississippi Company (Figure 24) presented a comparable 
picture for the middle and late stage of the boom, but it did not have an analogous AuM cluster 
in the early phase. By contrast, the South Sea Company (Figure 25) and the BoE (Figure 26) 
displayed a succession of relatively thinner peaks (rather than massive AuM clusters), with the 
weight of the AuM located in the penultimate stage of the boom. Yet, in spite of these 
differences, all these assets followed a comparable pattern: a) several AuM peaks (broad or thin) 
distributed all along the upward cycle; b) the bulk of the AuM concentrated before – and this is 
the key part – the last leg of the boom. That is to say, all these assets had “consumed” the largest 
part of their AuM in the months, or at least the weeks preceding the peak in the price. We could 
multiply the examples: almost all the assets studied in this paper repeated that same distribution. 
Including the DJIA during the 1920s bubble and the Nasdaq in the dot-com bubble (see below 
Figure 28 and Figure 29). In fact, there was only one exception to that general pattern: the 
WIC, which had its AuM heavily clustered towards the last part of the boom (Figure 27).  
Interestingly, the sequence displayed by the WIC is approximately what one might have 
expected according to the well-known Minsky bubble model. The finding that this sequence 
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appears to be the exception, rather than the norm, opens the way to a reexamination of the 
Minsky model (see below section 4). 
 
 
 
Figure 23. AuM distribution: boom of the two English marine insurance firms 
 
 
 
Figure 24. AuM distribution: boom of the Mississippi Company71 
 
 
                                               
71 The central AuM cluster (late Jun.-late Sep. 1719) represents a unique block. The interruptions, visible on the 
figure, correspond to days without a price quotation (mainly because of religious holydays). 
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Figure 25. AuM distribution: boom of the South Sea Company 
 
 
 
Figure 26. AuM distribution: boom of the BoE 
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Figure 27. AuM distribution: boom of the WIC 
 
 
3. Divergence between price and RSI 
Bullish and bearish divergences constitute other useful elements to analyze individual assets or 
to compare them. For technical analysts, a divergence signals a potential market turn; for 
scholars trying to understand the dynamic of the underlying asset, the divergence represents a 
question mark. Why did the RSI decline (in the case of a bearish divergence) when the price 
was rising to all time heights? A possible explanation would be that the divergence resulted from 
a double movement: 1) “naïve” investors – lured by the booming price – entering the market 
en masse; 2) well-informed arbitrageurs – having decided to stop riding the boom – taking 
advantage of the situation to liquidate their positions.72 The difficulty with this explanation is 
that bearish divergences did not happen systematically: the Mississippi and South Sea stocks 
experienced it, for example, but not the WIC or the marine insurance firms.  
 
  
                                               
72 The role of heterogeneous beliefs and diverse actors in financial bubbles has been investigated by a large 
literature. See for instance Shleifer, A., Inefficient markets: An introduction to behavioural finance (Oxford, 2000); Abreu, 
D. & Brunnermeier, M. K., “Bubbles and crashes” Econometrica, 71, 1 (2003); Xiong, W., “Bubbles, crises, and 
heterogeneous beliefs”, NBER working paper (2013). 
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Table 5. Bearish divergence 
Mississippi Company (Paris index) yes  
South Sea Company yes  
BoE yes  
EIC yes  
Million Bank yes  
RAC  no 
Marine insurance firms  no 
London index yes  
VOC yes  
WIC  no 
Amsterdam index  no 
Lisbon on London exch. rate  no 
Cadiz on London exch. rate yes  
 
 
Table 6. Bullish divergence 
Mississippi Company (Paris index)  no 
South Sea Company yes  
BoE yes  
EIC yes  
Million Bank yes  
RAC yes  
Marine insurance firms yes  
London index yes  
VOC yes  
WIC yes  
Amsterdam index yes  
Lisbon on London exch. rate  no 
Cadiz on London exch. rate  no 
 
 
So, a new question arises: considering that skilled/well-informed traders were roughly the same 
in all the major 1720 stocks, how come that, in some cases (bearish divergence) they apparently 
managed to successfully ride the market boom, whereas in other cases the crash apparently took 
them by surprise? Abreu and Brunnermeier suggests a potential explanation. 73 According to 
their model, bubbles burst in two different ways: a) for some exogenous reason; b) because of 
the endogenous selling pressure of arbitrageurs. The second situation requires coordination 
among a sufficient number of arbitrageurs, a coordination that will not happen if there is no 
“synchronizing event”. The key, therefore, would have been the presence or absence of such 
an event. When there was none, arbitrageurs could not coordinate their attack; the crash took 
them by surprise: there was no bearish divergence. By contrast, in those cases where there was 
                                               
73 Abreu, D. & Brunnermeier, M. K., “Bubbles”, cit. 
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a synchronizing event, arbitrageurs managed to exert a coordinated selling pressure, which first 
generated the bearish divergence, and then precipitated the crash. The interesting part would 
be to understand, for each case, what might have been the triggering event. In the case of the 
Mississippi Bubble, there was probably a conjunction between two events, both taking place 
late November 1719: the run on the Royal Bank and the acceleration in the decline of the 
French currency.74 
 
 
 Bearish divergence 
Synchronizing event yes 
No synchronizing event no 
 
 
Is there historical evidence supporting the thesis that the double event spurred a coordinated 
attack on the Mississippi Bubble by rational arbitrageurs? Yes and no. Forbonnais and Du 
Hautchamp mention that a group of investors (the so-called “réalisateurs”) sold their positions 
around that time.75 According to other reports, foreigners – and in particular Englishmen – 
represented a significant percentage of the early “réalisateurs”.76 The sharp decline of the 
French exchange rate, around that period, is further evidence of capital leaving France. Yet, on 
the other hand, there is not much archival evidence of English traders actually selling his 
Mississippi shares in late November or December 1719. Lord Londonderry and sir John 
Lambert, for instance, were among the first English actors exiting the Parisian market, and they 
only did that in January 1720, after the price had peaked.77 By contrast, the duke of Chandos 
kept most of his Mississippi shares throughout the French crash. This is noteworthy not only 
because Chandos was a well-informed and seasoned investor, but also because, in the months 
preceding the burst, he was increasingly sceptical about the sustainability of the Mississippi 
boom.78 More generally, if there is some evidence of actors managing to successfully ride the 
1719-20 bubbles, there is also plenty of evidence of informed investors unable (or unwilling) to 
do so.79  
                                               
74 About the run on the bank: Faure, E., La Banqueroute, cit., pp. 275-276. 
75 Quoted in ibid, p. 276. 
76 Among others sources, National Archives, SP 101/120, Paris, 27 November 1719, 18 December 1719; [Pâris-
Duverney, J.], Examen du livre intitulé Reflexions politiques sur les finances et le commerce (The Hague, 1740), I, p. 314. 
77 British Library, Add ms. 31140, f. 18, February 1720; Neal, L., “I am not master of events”: the speculations of John 
Law and Lord Londonderry in the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles (New Haven, 2012), p. 94. 
78 See, for instance, note 20 above; or Huntington Library, Stowe 57, 16, f. 367, letter to Drummond, 8 November 
1719. 
79 See for instance Temin, P. & Voth, H. J., “Riding the South Sea Bubble”, American Economic Review, 94, 5 (2004); 
Frehen, R. G .P., et al, “New evidence”, cit.; Kleer, R. A., “Riding a wave: the Company’s role in the South Sea 
Bubble”, The Economic History Review, 68, 1 (2015); Yamamoto, K., “Beyond Rational vs Irrational Bubbles: James 
Brydges the First Duke of Chandos during the South Sea Bubble”, in G. Nigro (ed.), Le crisi finanziarie: gestione, 
implicazioni sociali e conseguenze nell’età preindustriale (Firenze, 2016). 
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It makes sense to consider that bullish divergence resulted from an opposite dynamic 
compared to bearish divergence: 1) “naïve” investors capitulating and selling their positions; 
2) arbitrageurs selectively “bottom fishing” stocks that appeared to have become cheap. For 
example, early November 1720, the duke of Chandos purchased EIC stock, declaring that he 
felt it had reached a low and that, with its 10 per cent “constant dividend”, it was a good buy.80  
From a comparative perspective, it is interesting to see which were, among the English stocks 
analyzed here, those that first experienced a reversal in their downward momentum. Their 
prices bottomed out around the same time (13-17 Dec. 1720 Julian),81 but not their respective 
RSIs. One might have expected that, in the aftermath of the great crash, investors shunned the 
most speculative stocks, and that they “bottom fished” the two great moneyed companies, the 
BoE and the EIC, which seemed to have the most stable business prospects. Yet, the opposite 
was true: the stocks that had risen the most during the boom – the marine insurance firms and 
the RAC – were the first to see their RSI find a bottom (19 and 21 Sep. 1720 respectively). The 
EIC was next (22 Sep.), followed by the beleaguered South Sea Company (28 Sep.), while the 
BoE bottomed out more than two weeks later (15 Oct.) What is more, the RSI of the BoE 
reached a lower low (6.17 vs. 11.98) compared to the South Sea.  
There is a plausible explanation to this paradox. The government was then trying to broker 
a deal between the BoE and the South Sea (the famous “Bank contract”) that should have 
helped rescue the latter.82 The divergence in momentum suggests that investors viewed the 
contract as more beneficial to the South Sea than to the Bank. Indeed, investors disliked the 
“contract” so much, that the Bank entered a downward SMLV the day after it opened its books 
(24 Sep.) to raise £3 million in new equities in order to finance the rescue operation.83 It is 
noteworthy that the Bank’s RSI bottomed out the very day when the subscriptions books were 
closed (15 Oct.) Evidently, investors were relieved by the fact that the capital call was not fully 
subscribed (only £2,281,000 were raised), which meant that the BoE would not be able to rescue 
the company as promised in the contract. By contrast, this was not good news for the South 
Sea, and its RSI fell accordingly. Yet – for reasons that would need to be better understood – 
the South Sea’s RSI did not collapse below the September lows and the upward momentum 
trend was thus not broken. 
 
 
                                               
80 Letter to Richard Cantillon. Quoted in Murphy, A. E., Richard Cantillon: Entrepreneur and Economist (Oxford, 
1986), p. 183. Yet, “bottom fishers” were possibly also driven by motives more complex than simply a cheap price. 
See in particular L. Neal, The rise of financial capitalism, cit. pp. 114-115 convincing hypothesis about Dutch 
investments in BoE stock in autumn 1720. 
81 With the exception of the RAC (whose price bottomed out already the 17 Nov. 1720) and the Million Bank 
(whose price and RSI were still falling at the end of Dec. 1720).  
82 On the “Bank contract”: Dickson, P. G. M., The financial revolution, cit.; Clapham, J. H., The Bank of England, cit. 
83 Another ominous event happened the 24 September: the Sword Blade Company (the South Sea Company’s 
banking affiliate) ceased payments. The directors of the Bank of England immediately interpreted this as the 
beginning of a general liquidity crisis. See Neal, L. The rise of financial capitalism, cit. p. 115. 
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4. A critique of Minsky-Kindleberger notion of “euphoria”  
[This section is also very incomplete] 
Does the presence of a SMLV constitute a clear indicator that a market boom or crash is 
underway?84 Yes in the case of 1719-20 equity markets, and probably yes in many other markets 
as well. This hypothesis, however, would need to be tested systematically, across markets and 
centuries, to see whether: a) there may be examples of booms or crashes without a SMLV; or 
b) SMLVs without a boom or crash. The latter seems particularly implausible. A SMLV is by 
definition the result of an extremely strong trend, and it is difficult to imagine that such a trend 
would fail to generate a boom on the upside, or a crash on the downside. In particular, because 
SMLVs often do not come alone, but tend to be followed (in the next weeks or months) by other 
SMLVs.85 Anyhow, a SMLV is certainly consistent with a market boom or a market bust. 
 
 
Table 7. SMLV 
Mississippi Company (Paris index) yes  
South Sea Company yes  
BoE yes  
EIC yes  
Million Bank yes  
Marine insurance firms yes  
London index yes  
VOC yes  
WIC yes  
Amsterdam index yes  
Lisbon on London exch. rate yes  
Cadiz on London exch. rate  no 
 
 
To what extent an upward SMLV corresponds to the “euphoria” stage described in the Minsky-
Kindleberger model? As it is well know, that famed model posits that financial crisis – in 
particular, market bubbles – follow a general pattern in several stages: they are set in motion by 
some “displacement” (an exogenous shock); they morph into a boom, and eventually into a 
period of euphoria; and they end with a crash, or at least a period of “financial distress”.86 
                                               
84 The answer depends, of course, on the definition of those two terms. One of the most commonly-used 
definitions – considering boom and crash synonyms of “bull” and “bear” markets – is the price surging (or 
declining) more than 20%. See for instance Pagan, A. R. & Sossounov, K. A. “A simple framework for analysing 
bull and bear markets”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 18, 1 (2003); Ritholtz, B., “How to Spot a Bull or Bear 
Market”, Bloomberg (August 14, 2017). 
85 See examples above. 
86 Minsky, H. P., “The Financial Instability Hypothesis: Capitalistic Processes and the Behavior of the Economy” 
(Cambridge, 1982); Id., Can “It” Happen Again? Essays on Instability and Finance (London, 2016) [1982]; Kindleberger, 
C. P. & Aliber, R. Z., Manias, Panics and Crashes (Basingstoke, 2015) [1978]. 
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Kindleberger explicitly connected the notion of euphoria to the “speculative overtrading” 
concept used by classical economists. He underlined that “speculative overtrading” was in fact 
the last phase of the euphoria sequence, that is to say the very last leg of the boom, before it 
turned into what he called “convulsion” and “revulsion”.87 The “overtrading” concept came 
from Adam Smith. Kindleberger noted that it was “less than precise” and that it included 
speculation, overestimation of prospective returns, and excessive leverage.88 I would personally 
argue that, for the classical economists, “overtrading” meant fundamentally a temporary 
“excess” of demand: not so much too much trading, but rather too many traders, in the sense of 
too many buyers.89 It would be perhaps clearer, therefore, to talk about “overbuying” instead of 
“overtrading”. Be as it may, this leads us back to our question. Indeed, “overbuying” bears 
many obvious similarities with the RSI concept of “overbought”, and even more so with the 
notion of an extended period of “overboughtness”. So, to some extent, there is a parallel 
between upward SMLV and the Minsky-Kindleberger’s concept of euphoria. 
There is, however, a crucial difference. According to the Minsky-Kindleberger model, 
euphoria is the last stage of the boom.90 By contrast, empirical evidence shows that upward 
SMLV does not necessarily take place at the end. On the contrary, the evidence underlines that 
uSMLVs happen in different moments of the boom, including its early stage. The Mississippi 
stock went through its first uSMLV (Mar. 1719) while the price was still under par, and nine 
months before it peaked. The South Sea Company’s first uSMLV (Jan. 1720) occurred five 
months before the peak.  
Moreover, we have underlined above (section III.3) the non-linear character of AuM 
distributions. The bulk of the upward momentum of the London index, the marine insurance 
firms, and the Mississippi Company occurred in the middle stage of the boom (Figure 22, Figure 
23, Figure 24). The South Sea Company and BoE displayed several AuM peaks distributed all 
along the cycle (Figure 25 and Figure 26). And it is noteworthy that the two most famous bubbles 
of the 20th century – the 1929 and dot-com bubbles – also exhibited that same pattern (Figure 
28 and Figure 29).  
 
                                               
87 Kindleberger, C. P. & Aliber, R. Z., Manias, Panics and Crashes (Basingstoke, 2015) [1978], p. 90 quoting the 
XIXth-century banker lord Overstone. 
88 Kindleberger, Manias, cit., p. 28. 
89 See for instance Smith A., An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, The Glasgow Edition, 1979, 
(reprint Indianapolis, 1981) [1776], vol. I, pp. 438, 442. See also Mill, J. S., Principles of Political Economy, with some 
of their Application to Social Philosophy (Toronto, 1965) [1848] vol. III, p. 645 about the notion of “excess” demand, 
and p. 657 about “undue extension of credit”. 
90 Kindleberger, Manias, cit., pp. 94-98, describes a phase called “distress”, characterized by a loss of confidence 
when the market is at the top. For him, distress takes place after the euphoria phase, but also after the peak in the 
price. He writes: “The end of a period of rising prices for assets leads to distress whenever a significant number of 
investors have based their purchases of these assets on the anticipation that their prices will continue to increase.” 
(p. 97). Distress appears thus different from the divergence between price and RSI that we analyze here. 
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Figure 28. AuM distribution: the 1929 bubble  
Dow Jones Industrial Average (Jan. 1926-Sep. 1929) 
 
 
Figure 29. AuM distribution: dot-com bubble  
Nasdaq Composite (June 1998- March 2000) 
 
 
I have found only one case where the upward momentum distribution seems consistent (at least 
to some extent) with the Minsky-Kindleberger model: the WIC with its AuM predominantly 
concentrated in the last stage of the boom (Figure 27). A hypothetical AuM distribution graph 
entirely consistent with that model would presumably evoke some sort of rock of Gibraltar. That 
is to say, a graph displaying price and AuM increasing in parallel, at first progressively, then 
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possibly exponentially, until their synchronous apex, and synchronous downfall. It is not 
excluded that some assets might have followed the said distribution. Yet, overwhelming 
evidence suggests that the said “Gibraltar pattern” is not the general rule, and that it would be 
at best an exception. 
The general tendency (that needs to be confirmed with further research) appears to be what 
we may call the “medieval town” or “forest” pattern. Namely, several AuM peaks – distributed 
all along the upward cycle – reminding the skyline of a towered settlement, or a small forest 
with trees tall and tiny, large and thin. This town/forest pattern has two main variants. In the 
first one, the bulk of the AuM is predominantly situated in the middle stage of the boom. See 
for example the London index, the marine insurance firms, the Mississippi Company, or the 
1929 bubble (Figure 22, Figure 23, Figure 24, Figure 28). In the second variant, the mass of the 
AuM mostly happens in the penultimate stage of the boom (i.e. some weeks, or months before 
the apex in the price). See for example the South Sea Company, the BoE, or the dot-com bubble 
(Figure 25, Figure 26, Figure 29). The difference between these two distributions, however, is 
not always clear-cut. What is unequivocal, though, is that the “medieval town” pattern, 
whatever its variant, does not support the Minsky-Kindleberger concept of euphoria. 
 
 
 
Figure 30. Two quite different patterns/skylines: medieval town91 vs. Gibraltar 
 
 
Furthermore, the very notion of divergence between price and RSI (see above) highlights that 
there is a tendency for “overbuying” to abate before the price reaches the summit. In other 
words, the very last leg of the boom does not always coincide with an upward SMLV. 
Sometimes it does coincide, such as in the case of the Amsterdam index in August 1720. Quite 
often, it does not. The last uSMLV of the Mississippi ended the 9 December 1719, whereas the 
price peaked the 25 December, more than two weeks later. The last uSMLV of the dot-com 
bubble (i.e. the Nasdaq) ended the 3 January 2000, more than two months before the top in the 
price (10 March). In fact, discrepancy between price and RSI appears to be much more 
common than coincidence between uSMLV and price peak. 
                                               
91 The town represented in the image is San Gimignano (Italy). 
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Divergence between price and RSI is counterintuitive and thus especially interesting. It 
would make sense to think that euphoria is the “force” that propels a stock towards its apex. 
Momentum analysis, however, shows that in reality markets often do not work like that. We 
have even seen that some stocks – in particular the Mississippi Company – reached the top in 
their price with a RSI below 70. In other words, not only the Mississippi share was not in an 
upward SMLV, but it had also entered a period of weak momentum: something certainly not 
consistent with Minsky’s notion of euphoria. Weak momentum may have reflected 
circumspection or indecision among market participants; it was probably also the consequence 
of foreign speculators leaving Paris; yet it is noteworthy that it did not prevent the stock to jump 
to its all-time high.  
In sum, Minsky’s thesis about euphoria is not supported by empirical evidence, and it is even 
fundamentally contradicted by it. 
 
 
5. A uSMLV-based definition of “euphoria”  
The problem is not the notion of euphoria itself – it is a fundamental concept in bubble studies 
– but rather its problematic definition in the Minsky-Kindleberger model. A useful definition of 
euphoria needs: a) to be consistent with empirical evidence; and b) to be quantifiable, in order 
to allow precise comparisons between different asset bubbles. Our study offers a possible 
definition along these lines. Considering that euphoria is an uncommon phenomenon that 
manifests itself as a sustained upward pressure on the price – and therefore as a prolonged 
period of upward momentum – we may posit that an uSMLV would be, indeed, a good 
indicator of euphoria. That is to say, we may rule out that euphoria is happening unless the RSI 
has spent more than 15 consecutive trading days in “overbought” territory.  
Tt is important to note that the choice of the number of days defining a SMLV is subjective, 
at least to some extent. As detailed above (section I-2), the 15 days threshold seems a good 
compromise: it corresponds to a relatively infrequent situation (only 42 occurrences for the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average from 1896 to 2018), but not so rare as to become irrelevant. Needless 
to say, there is nothing dogmatic about the number 15, and 14 or 16 days would probably work 
just as fine. The fundamental element is the notion that euphoria is characterised by an 
extended period of strong momentum with low volatility, and the fact that SMLVs appear to 
be relatively rare events. 
According to our definition, euphoria – as we have shown – can take place in different 
moments of a boom. The South Sea Company, for instance, went through five so-defined 
periods of “euphoria” in 1720, the longest period taking place in May-June (Figure 31).92 The 
graph simply labels “euphoria” the five uSMLV. The process is so straightforward that there is 
probably no need to add further examples.  
                                               
92 The fifth period of euphoria, in July, appears discontinuous on the chart. This is because there was no quotation 
for some days (13-16 July). 
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Figure 31. Five phases of “euphoria” (uSMLV-based definition) of the South Sea Company  
 
 
5. Momentum and the spreading of the 1720 equity booms  
[This section is also very incomplete] 
The last consideration of the paper relates to the mechanism that would explain why equity 
booms spread from one country to the other in 1719-20. My hypothesis, drawn from the theory 
developed by Caginalp et al., is that undervaluation played a role in this diffusion mechanism. 
The idea is that the RSI is a better tool than price to investigate this hypothesis.  
Caginalp et al. have shown, with experimental asset markets, that a large initial 
undervaluation, in the context of excess cash, motivates traders to buy due to fundamental 
considerations; the new trend becomes robust as trending traders are drawn in, and this sets in 
motion an asset bubble.93 According to the authors, the size of the bubble is an increasing 
function of the extent of undervaluation at the outset. 
Initial undervaluation (compared to the market capitalization of the South Sea Company or 
the EIC) and excess cash were definitely two elements present at the onset of the Mississippi 
Bubble. As the price of the Mississippi Company skyrocketed, the English companies became 
undervalued in relative terms. Contemporaries considered the stream of revenues or dividends 
                                               
93  Caginalp, G., Porter, D., & Smith, V., “Momentum and overreaction in experimental asset markets”, 
International Journal of industrial Organization, 18, 1 (2000); Id. “Overreaction, momentum, liquidity, and price bubbles 
in laboratory and field asset markets”, SSRN papers (2000); Id. “Financial bubbles: Excess cash, momentum, and 
incomplete information”, The Journal of Psychology and Financial Markets, 2, 2 (2001). 
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(what they called “intrinsick value”) to estimate the valuation of a company. 94 Yet, there is 
plenty of evidence that, in practice, they also considered relative valuation (i.e. valuation versus 
a peer group).95 Even today, this is the type of valuation most used by practitioners.96 Following 
Caginalp’s model, the undervaluation, in relative terms, of the English companies would have 
become the cause of the following English bubble. Figure 32 shows that the RSI of the South 
Sea Company entered overbought territory at a time when it was indeed highly undervalued 
relative to the Mississippi Company: the market capitalization (converted in £) of the latter was 
more than ten times larger. 
It seems plausible that, around 1720, London was particularly attentive to what was 
happening in Paris (mainly because France and Britain were then the two major powers in 
Europe), whereas Amsterdam was probably more attentive to what happened in London 
(mainly because it appears that the Dutch considered that the EIC represented a more serious 
threat for the East India trade, compared to the French East India company). Thus, it is possible 
that investors perceived that the VOC was undervalued only once the EIC started to boom. 
Interestingly, Figure 33 seems to confirm this hypothesis: the RSI of the VOC spiked very 
rapidly after the change in market capitalization (converted in £) relative to the EIC. Likewise, 
once the WIC started to be involved with marine insurance (from April 1720), its RSI closely 
trailed the boom of the English marine insurance firms (Figure 34). The other Dutch marine 
insurance companies (such as Stad Rotterdam) and their Hamburg peers presumably followed 
the same trajectory. 
 
 
                                               
94 E.g. An estimate of the intrinsick value of the South Sea stock (London? 1720). About equity valuation in 1720, see 
Harrison, P, “Rational Equity Valuation at the Time of the South Sea Bubble”, History of Political Economy, 33, 2 
(2001); Deringer, W., “For What It’s Worth: Historical Financial Bubbles and the Boundaries of Economic 
Rationality”, Isis, 106, 3 (2015). 
95 See for instance, National Archives, SP 101/68, f. 103; SP 78/164, f. 415; Savary, J., Le parfait negociant (Paris, 
1721), vol. I, partie II, pp. 225-226. 
96 Pinto, J.E. et al., “Equity valuation: a survey of professional practice”, SSRN papers (2015); Rossi, E. & Forte, 
G., Assessing Relative Valuation in Equity Markets: Bridging Research and Practice. (London, 2016). 
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Figure 32. Was the spike in the South Sea’s RSI related to the undervaluation of the firm? 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33. Did the VOC’s RSI respond to the spike in the market cap differential vs. the EIC? 
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Figure 34. The WIC’s RSI trailing the boom of the English marine firms (after April 1720) 
 
 
Conclusion:  
The model presented in these pages is still a work in progress, but it already enables us to achieve 
some tangible results. We have analysed around twenty assets, from different asset classes 
(equities, foreign exchange), countries (France, Britain, United States, etc.) and centuries (18th 
and 20th century), and we have consistently generated fully comparable results. We have applied 
the model in two directions: a) comparison and b) thorough investigation of the behaviour of 
single assets. Both directions have generated interesting insights. To give just one example of 
each approach: we saw that the comparison of the VOC and WIC’s upward and downward 
momentum does not support the traditional thesis that the price of the latter had been 
manipulated; we also saw that the spike in the RSI of the South Sea indicates that the market 
instantly and enthusiastically reacted to the beginning of the secret talks between the firm and 
the British government (14 November 1719). The third direction that we explored was to 
combine momentum analysis with other theoretical works: Abreu and Brunnermeier’s model 
about “synchronizing events” helped us understand why some stocks had gone through a 
“bearish divergence”; Caginalp et al.’s studies about experimental markets gave us a key to 
formulate a hypothesis about the sequence of the 1719-20 equity booms. 
Overall, the paper yields two main outcomes. On the one hand, it sheds new light on the 
1719-20 bubbles. On the other hand, it demonstrates that the overwhelming empirical evidence 
does not support – and even fundamentally contradicts – Minsky-Kindleberger’s notion of 
“euphoria”. The paper thus proposes a different definition of euphoria – quantifiable and 
consistent with empirical evidence – that is based on the notion of uSMLV. 
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